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Case No. 9229 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTfH I L E D 
ALBERT A. CECIL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LA \TERA C. CECIL, ELIZA 'C. BUT-
TERFIELD, as Guardian of the per-
son of La Vera ·C. Cecil, and W ALI(-
ER BANI{ & TRlJST COMP A.NY, 
a corporation, as Guardian of the 
Estate of La \T era C. Cecil, an Incom-
petent, 
Defenftants and Appellants. 
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GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON, 
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IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERT A. CECIL, 
Plaintiff and 1-lespondcnt, 
vs. 
LA\~l~~RA C. CECIL, ELIZA ·C. BUT-
TERFIELD, as Guardian of the per-
son of La \T era C. Cecil, and WALK-
}~R B..:~XI~ & TRUST COMPANY, 
a corporation, as Guardian of the 
Estate of La Vera C. Cecil, an Incom-
petent, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
·Case No. 9229 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in favor 
of the plaintiff and against the defendants modifying 
the decree of divorce and thereby relieving plaintiff from 
any obligation to pay alimony to defendant Walker Bank 
& Trust Company as guardian of the estate of La Vera 
C. Cecil, an incompetent (R. 104), and awarding to 
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plaintiff judgment in the amount of $340.00 together 
\vith costs incurred (R. 105). 
La Vera C. Cecil and Albert A. Cecil were married 
~iay 4, 1935. On June 22, 1953, the plaintiff, Albert A. 
Cecil, commenced an action for divorce against LaVera 
C. Cecil (R. 1). An answer and counterclaim in said 
matter \Vas filed on July 11, 1953 (R. 3) and the defend-
ant LaVera C. ·C·ecil was, during the pendency of said 
action and on the 23rd day of October, 1953, adjudged an 
incompetent (R. 9). Guardianship proceedings, the ap-
pointment of Eliza C. Butterfield, mother of La Vera C. 
Cecil, as guardian of the person, and Walker Bank & 
Trust Company as guardian of the estate of La Vera C. 
Cecil were \Yith the consent and approval of plaintiff, 
and as a direct result of said appointments the plaintiff 
amended his complaint alleging La Vera C. ·Cecil to be 
an incompetent. 
During the pendency of the divorce action, and prior 
to the guardianship proceedings, a stipulation and agree-
ment was entered into providing for the payment of 
alimony, distribution of property and custody of the 
minor child (R. 11-12). The stipulation and agree-
ment was approved by the Probate Court on the 30th 
day of October, 1953 (Probate File 36053). On the 3rd 
day of November, 1953, the plaintiff \Yas awarded a 
decree of divorce, which decree incorporated the provi-
sions of the stipulation and awarded to the estate of 
La Vera C. Cecil, one-half of the net value of the ho1ne 
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.) 
and furni~hing~; of the partic)s and the surn of $85.00 per 
1nonth as ali1nony for the said La\; era C. (~ecil (R. 16-18). 
A purported marriage was entered into on the 6th 
day of January, 1959, bet-vveen La\ ... era C. Cecil, an in-
colnpetent, and Dar-vvin ·C. Richardson at Elko, Nevada, 
as indicated by a marriage certificate, Exhibit 1 P. Said 
1narriage was without the knowledge and consent of the 
guardians of the estate and person of the said La Vera 
C. Cecil (R. 57, 70). During the marriage LaVera C. 
Cecil and Darwin ·C. Richardson lived together but a 
short ti1ne, during which time they continually fought 
and \Yere thrown out of the hotel (R. 58-59). La Vera C. 
Crcil, an incompetent, by her guardian, Eliza C. Butter-
field, filed in the District ·Court of the Third Judicial 
District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, a 
eon1plaint against Darwin C. Richardson, wherein it was 
prayed that the purported marriage be dissolved and 
annulled (Court File 121299). The appearance and 
\vaiver of Darwin ·C. Richardson was signed on the 9th 
day of June, 1959, and the matter was heard before the 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson on the 12th day of June, 
1959, resulting in a decree declaring the marriage con-
tract to be null and void and of no force and effect 
(Court File 121299). The Court, in its Findings of Fact, 
found in the annulment proceedings as follows: 
"1. That the plaintiff is now and for several 
years last past has been a resident of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
"2. That on the 23rd day of October, 1953, 
the above entitled court entered its order appoint-
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4 
ing Eliza C. Butterfield as guardian of the per-
son, and Walker Bank & Trust ·Company as guard-
ian of the estate of the above named La Vera C. 
Cecil, an Incompetent; that said Eliza C. Butter-
field is now and at all times herein mentioned has 
been the duly appointed, qualified and acting 
guardian of the person of La Vera ·C. Cecil. 
"3. That on the 3rd day of N" ovember, 1953 
the above entitled court in Case No. 98922, vvherein 
Albert A. Cecil was plaintiff and Eliza C. Butter-
field, as guardian of the person, and Walker Bank 
& Trust ·Company, a corporation, as guardian of 
the estate of La Vera C. Cecil, an Incompetent, 
were defendants, entered its Decree of Divorce, 
which said decree has never been set aside or 
modified. 
"4. That on the 6th day of January, 1959 the 
above named La Vera C. Cecil was allegedly mar-
ried to the defendant, Dar\Yin ·C. Richardson, at 
Salt Lake City, Utah; that at the time of entering 
into said 1narriage contract the plaintiff ,.~las an 
incompetent and incapable of entering into said 
contract; that after said purp-orted 1narriage the 
parties only lived together a short time and at 
the present time are living separate and apart.'' 
(Court File 121299). 
The instant action by plaintiff \Yas commenced by 
filing a petition for modification of decree on the lOth 
day of July, 1959, \vhich petition sought the ter1nination 
of plaintiff's obligation to pay alimony as of January 6, 
1959, and judgment against defendant Walker Bank & 
Trust Company as guardian of the estate of La Vera c·. 
Cecil for the sum of $510.00 paid by plaintiff to defend-
ant Walker Bank & Trust Company for the use and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
benefit of the said La\.,. era C. Cecil s1nee January 6, 
19;)~) ( R. 19-20). An answer to the petition (R. 23-25) 
and a reply (R. 29-30) to the answer were filed raising 
the is~ues and leaving for determination by the court the 
effect of the guardianship proceedings and the annul-
Inent of the Inarriage betvveen ·Cecil and Richardson upon 
plaintiff's obligation to pay alimony. 
La 'T era C. Cecil was examined by Dr. Louis ~Ioench, 
a psychiatrist, on the 9th day of September, 1959, at the 
request of plaintiff's attorney pursuant to agreement of 
eounsel (R. 46). The Doctor's examination consisted of 
a psychiatric history and a mental status examination 
based on her medical history of previous illnesses, her 
1ne1nory, her reasoning ability to handle proverbs, and 
an exa1nination of her record in the State Hospital. The 
Doctor's diagnostic opinion was that La Vera C. Cecil 
'"'as suffering from paranoid schizophrenic reaction (R. 
47). \Vhen asked on direct examination for an opinion 
as to her mental competency to enter into a marriage 
relationship on January 6, 1959, the Doctor stated as 
follovvs: 
"~Iy opinion was that from the evidence that 
I had that she was probably not competent to 
enter into a marriage at that time." (R. 48). 
On cross examination the Doctor stated that he thought 
La, .... era C. Cecil was aware that she was getting mar-
ried and that, vvhile she understood she was being mar-
ried, she probably was not mentally capable of following 
through \Yith all of her responsibilities in the marriag-e 
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(R. 50-51). Stated another way, the Doctor felt that 
La Vera C. Cecil was not competent to marry as she did 
not understand the many responsibilties and require-
ments of a marriage contract. Eliza ·C. Butterfield, her 
mother, Edward G. Richards, Trust Officer of Walker 
Bank & Trust Coinpany, and Edward F. Richards, 
attorney for defendants herein, all of whom have had 
an opportunity to come in close contact with La Vera C. 
Cecil, were of the opinion that she was unable to handle 
her own affairs, understand the full purport of her 
actions and carry on marital relations during the period 
involved (R. 58, 67, 80). 
La Vera ·C. Cecil appeared in person before the Hon-
orable Stewart M. Hanson at the time of the hearing on 
the annulment and the Court had the opportunity of 
observing her mental condition. At the time of trial in 
the instant matter the Court was advised that La Vera 
C. ·Cecil was notified of the hearing and that her presence 
was requested, but she refused to attend. Counsel for 
defendants said he had no objection to an order of court 
being issued for her presence and would cooperate in 
every way to have her in court. N ot,vithstanding the 
court did not require her presence (R. 41, 57). 
The estate of La Vera C. Cecil, an incompetent, at 
the time of trial in the instant matter consisted of $471.52 
cash and $2000.00 in United States Treasury 4%% bonds 
due November 15, 1960, and said estate is being depleted 
in excess of $85.00 per month (R. 66, 74). 
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ST_l-\TEI\fENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
I. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CO·URT DECLARING 
THE l\IARRIAGE NULL AND VOID IS BINDING ON THE 
WORLD AND CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED. 
II. THE FINDING THAT LAVER.A C. CECIL WAS 
COMPE'TENT TO MARR.Y IS CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT 
OF THE EVIDENCE AND LAW. 
III. THE COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING ALI-
MONY REGARDLESS O·F THE VALIDITY O•F THE MAR-
RIAGE ON JANUARY 6, 1960. 
IV. THE JUDGMENT OF MODIFICA1TION, FINDINGS 
AND CO'NCLUSIONS IN SUPPOR.T THEREO:F ARE CON-
TRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW. 
AR.GUMENT 
I. THE JUDGTh1ENT OF THE COURT DECLARING 
THE l\1ARRIAGE NULL AND VOID IS BINDING ON THE 
\VORLD AND CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED. 
At the time of the hearing in the instant matter 
La'? era ·C. Cecil was not married nor had she been 
1narried from the time of the original decree of divorce, 
the purported marriage between her and Richardson 
having been judicially declared null and void. The pri-
mary purpose of the annulment proceedings V\ras to de-
termine and fix the status of La Vera C. 'Cecil, and the 
judgment fixing her status, being a judgment in rem, 
is conclusive and binding on the world. In subsequent 
actions, including the instant matter, the annulment pro-
ceedings cannot be collaterally attacked. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The binding effect of an adjudication, the primary 
purpose of \vhich is to determine the status of individ-
uals, is well stated in the case of HiJlton v. Snyder (1910), 
37. Utah 384, 108 P. 698, wherein the Court stated: 
"As we understand the rule which distinguishes 
a status from any other element in a case, it is 
this : If an action, although prosecuted by one 
individual against another, is instituted for the 
sole purpose of changing or declaring the status 
of either one or both of the parties to the action, 
then, in the absence of fraud or collusion in ob-
taining the judgment, it is binding upon all the 
'vorld as \Vell as the parties and their privies." 
This rule is supported by the case of !leaden v. Pope & 
Talbot, Inc. (3 C.C. 1958'), 252 F. 2d 739, wherein it is 
stated: 
"It IS our v1evv that the proceeding in South 
Carolina \\-as an ·adjudication the prilnary pur-
pose of \Yhich was to declare the status of indi-
viduals, and to that extent it possessed charac-
teristics of a proceeding in rem. 2 Freeman on 
Judgments, Sec. 900 (1925); 31 Aln. Jur., Jndg-
Inents Sec. 441 (1940); 35 Am. Jur., Marriage 
Sec. 235 (1941) ~ In re Holben's Estate, 1930, 
300 Pa. 169, 150 A. 604, 605. Being a decree 
in ren1, its adjudication of the validity of Ben-
ton's second marriage was conclusive on the 
\vorld, even in subsequent actions on different 
subject matters. Restaten1ent. Judgments See. 74 
(1942); 2 Free1nan on Judgments Sec. 900 
(1925)." 
A general state1nent of the law is found is 30A 
A1n. Jur., Judgments, Section 135, page 248, as follows: 
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.. J udgrnents in rein are l'(~garded as conclusive 
hy the courts. Indeed, the rule limiting the con-
clusiveness of a judgn1ent to the parties to the 
proceeding in which it "\vas rendered, and their 
privies, has been declared subject to an exception 
in the case of a judgment in rem, which, the court 
having jurisdiction, is binding on third per~~on~, 
or on all parties in interest, or, as it is frequently 
said, on the vvhole world. * * *" 
See also In re Marrow's Estate ( 1937, Colo.), 68 P. 2d 36. 
The only "\vay to disturb the annuhnent proceeding 
1s by direct attack, which was not done in this case. 
vVhile the plaintiff's pleadings challenge the annulment 
decree on the basis of false misrepresentation, there is 
no evidence in the record that said decree was procured 
through fraud or otherwise. In fact the court made a 
specific finding that the marriage between Cecil and 
Richardson had been annulled, which finding, together 
",.ith others, clearly set forth that the decree of annuln1ent 
stands as entered. 
The case of Hilton v. Snyder, supra, expressed the 
Yie"\v that in nearly all, if not all jurisdictions, special 
proceedings are provided by which the status of certain 
individuals may be determined and established when for 
special reasons it becomes necessary to do so. 
Title 30-1-17, Ut,ah Code Annotated 1953 provides 
that when doubt is felt as to the validity of a marriage 
either party may, in a court of equity, demand its avoid-
ance or affirmance. 
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The only necessary parties to the suit for annulment 
''Tere La Vera C. Cecil, her guardian, and the defendant 
Richardson. 1\tfrs. Cecil appeared personally and by her 
guardian and the defendant Richardson appeared by 
written 'vaiver and consent. 
The effect of the annulment proceedings was to 
destroy the marriage relationship ab initio and places 
the parties, as to their property rights, in the same 
position as though the annulled marriage had not taken 
place. 
II. THE FINDING THAT LAVERA C. CECIL WAS 
COMPE1TENT TO MARR.Y IS CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT 
OF THE EVIDENCE AND LAW. 
We preface our argument under Point II by stating 
that the annulment proceedings and its effect should re-
quire a reversal of the judgment for modification of 
decree of divorce. 
The prior adjudication of the insanity of La \T era C. 
Cecil is prima facie proof of unsoundness of mind at 
the time she entered into the marriage contract 'vith 
Dar,vin C. Richardson. 35 A11L Jur., ~farriage, Section 
114, page 253; Hilton v. Snyder, supra. 
In the Matter of the Estate and Guardianship of 
La Vera C. Cecil, an Incompetent, Probate File 36053, it 
is disclosed that La \T era ·C. Cecil has never been de-
clared competent and the. guardianship terminated. The 
effect of the guardianship proceeding is well stated in 
the case of Kuchnsted v. Turnwal, (Fla.) 155 So. 847, 
as follows: 
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'"It has also been held on good authority that 
one adjudicated to be insane is presun1ed to 
continue so until it is shown that sanitY has been 
restored (cases cited)." · 
and in 29 A nl. J ~tr., Insane Persons, Section 67, page 191, 
\Yhich states as follows: 
"Transactions After Adjudication and _I\fter 
Appointment of Guardian.-According to the n1a-
jority rule, the appointment of a guardian or 
committee to control and manage the property 
of a person following an adjudication that he 
is incompetent because of insanity or habitual 
drunkenness operates, within the jurisdiction at 
any rate, to render contracts, other than purchase 
of necessaries, made hy him during the existence 
of such guardianship absolutely void. The same 
rule applies to his conveyances and renders them 
void, even as to subsequent purchasers. Moreover, 
under some statutes, every contract by a lunatic, 
after he is so found by a jury in a proceeding to 
determine his competency, is void as against him 
and his estate. The effect of an adjudication in 
invalidating subsequent contracts and convey-
ances of an incompetent depends upon the extent 
to which it divests him of the capacity to act in 
his own behalf. The appointment of a guardian 
of the property of an incompetent operates to 
divest the latter of the power to contract or to 
convey. His incapacity arises as a matter of 
la,v, and does not depend upon an actual insanity 
subsisting at the time of the act in question. It 
exists when he is having a lucid interval and even 
at a time \vhen he is sane, unless the guardianship 
has been terminated by an order of court or has 
been abandoned. An order of court approving the 
contract, of one under guardianship, calling for 
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the surrender of his property does not validate 
the contract unless the court has jurisdiction to 
order a disposition of the ward's property in 
proceedings properly brought before it for such 
purpose. * * *" 
While a person of unsound mind may pursue a pur-
pose vvith the con1posure and regularity of a person of 
sound mind, such conduct alone does not create the ca-
pacity to marry. In order to have the mental capacity 
sufficient to contract a valid marriage the contracting 
party must understand the nature of the contract and 
the duties and responsibilities it creates. 
Even though Doctor Th1oench testified that La \T era 
·C. Cecil knew she was marrying Darwin C. Richardson, 
he nevertheless was of the opinion that she "\\:~as not con1-
petent to enter into the n1arriage at the tin1e of its con-
surnmation. In fact, on cross-examination~ the doctor 
pointed out that in his opinion La \T era C. Cecil did not 
understand the many responsibilities and requirements 
of a marriage contract. The doctor's opinion "\Y'"as shared 
'vith those most closely connected "\Yith La \"T"era C. Cecil, 
incompetent. 
Reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the plaintiff, it clearly appears in view of the guardian-
ship proceedings, the annulment proceedings, the testi-
mony of Doctor Moench and all those most closely con-
nected with La Vera C. Cecil that the finding of the court 
to the effect that La\ .. era C. Cecil "\Yas competent to 
marry on January 6, 1960 is not supported by the evi-
dence. 
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III. THE COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING ALI-
MONY REGARDLESS OF THE VALIDITY O·F THE MAR-
RIAGE ON JANUARY 6, 1960. 
A "·'ife does not automatically lose her right to ali-
lnony upon remarriage. Where there would be an 
unconscionable or inequitable result such as would be 
created in the instant matter, the court under its equit-
able powers should not terminate an award of alimony. 
La Vera C. Cecil is an incompetent, having been 
adjudicated as such on the 23rd day of October, 1953, 
during the pendency of the divorce action and after 
having been married to the plaintiff for a period of 
approximately 18 years. 
In the original divorce decree La Vera C. Cecil was 
deprived of the custody of her minor child, was awarded 
one-half of the value of the real property amounting to 
$4613.95, together with the sum of $85.00 per month ali-
mony. At the time of the hearing in the instant matter 
there remained in her estate the sum of $24 71.52, which 
amotmt is being depleted at a rate in excess of $85.00 
per month. T:o terminate the payment of alimony and 
charge her estate with a judgment in the amount of 
$340.00 would deplete her estate to a point where it 
would not be long before La Vera C. ·Cecil would become 
a charge of the State of Utah and dependent entirely 
upon the Welfare Department for her care, supp·ort and 
maintenance. Where conditions exist, as existed in this 
case, the court, regardless of the validity or invalidity 
of the marriage, should have continued the payment of 
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alimony for LaVera C. Cecil's support and maintenance 
in accordance with the views expressed in the case of 
Ausbad v. Aust~ad, 2 Utah 2d 49, 269 P. 2d 284, wherein 
it is stated as follows : 
"In reaching this decision vve are not to be 
understood as holding that the same result ·\\Tould 
eventuate 'vhere a su1n of alimony was decreed 
in lieu of dower, or in settlement of property 
rights acquired by the wife, or where the alimony 
is awarded in a lump sun1 payable in installments. 
And we further observe that under some excep-
tional circumstances this result might be so un-
conscionable or inequitable that the court, under 
its equitable powers would decree that the wife 
does not lose her right to alimony upon re-
marriage. In such instance the burden would be 
upon the wife to prove those facts." 
Finding Number 6 to the effect that La \T era C. Cecil 
received a bargain in the original divorce proceedings 
is unwarranted and not supported by the evidence. The 
court in making this finding disregards the fact that 
prior to and at the time of the original decree of divorce 
she was mentally ill; that she entered the State Hospital 
on May 2, 1952 and vvas not discharged until October, 
1954. She was not responsible for her conduct toward 
the plaintiff, and the award, nominal in nature, was an 
app~roval of the pToperty settlement agreement entered 
into between the parties and their attorneys, which award 
took into consideration the mental condition of La\7era 
C. Cecil as i't existed then and as it exists at the present 
time. 
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IV. THE JUDGMENT OF MODIFICA'TION, FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS IN SUPPORT THEREO:F ARE CON-
TRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW. 
The judgment of modification, findings and conclu-
sions in support thereof are contrary to law and the facts 
in this case. The reasons for our position covering this 
point have been pointed out in the argument covering 
Points I, II and III. 
CON·C·L US ION 
In conclusion we respectfully submit that the annul-
Inent proceeding is binding on the world and cannot be 
challenged collaterally, nor can the marriage to Richard-
son be declared valid in this proceeding. 
The court has erred in its finding and conclusion, 
and in justice and equity the judgment for modification 
of decree of divorce should be set aside and vacated and 
plaintiff should be required to pay the money now due 
and owing under the terms of the original decree, and 
defendants should be awarded a reasonable attorneys' 
fee for the defense of this action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON, 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellants. 
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